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TECHNIQUES FOR
REGULATING MILITARY
FORCE
MONICA HAKIMI

DECISIONS to use military force can be among the most consequential that a
government makes. They can also be difficult to regulate. Even a preliminary survey
reveals that there is considerable variation, both across countries and over time
within particular countries, in how democratic societies regulate the use of force. 1
In this Chapter, I examine three regulatory techniques that states use: (1) establish
substantive standards on when the government may or may not use armed force, (2)
allocate among different branches of government the authority to deploy the country's armed forces, and (3) subject such decisions to oversight or review. After
presenting this typology, I reflect on its implications for further comparative research
on war powers regulation.
Three points at the outset help frame what follows. First, I am an American lawyer
with limited exposure to the war powers regulations of other countries, so I draw
heavily on the work of the other contributors to this volume. My approach has certain
limits, including that the typology that I present does not purport to be exhaustive or
representative. Other accounts of how specific countries regulate war powers would
deepen our understanding of those countries and could bring to light additional
techniques that are used. Yet building on the work of scholars who are themselves
immersed in the relevant legal systems has real virtues. It allows me to capture the law

1
Other studies have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Sandra Dieterich, Hartwig Hummel, &
Stefan Marschall, Parliamentary War Powers: A Survey of 25 European Parliaments, Occasional Paper
No. 21, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 9 (2010) (finding "a remarkable
variance regarding the war powers of national parliaments in Europe"); Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters, &
Cosima Glahn, Parliamentary War Powers Around the World, 1999-2004, Occasional Paper No. 22,
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 11 (2010) ("The powers of parliaments in
this issue area vary widely among democracies around the world").
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not only as it appears on the books but also as it plays out in discrete institutional
settings. It thus enriches the analysis.
Second, war powers regulation can have manifold functions and effects. In some
contexts, it might constrain governmental actors and curb the use of force. But it need
not serve those functions to be legally relevant or effective. For example, it might
instead legitimize decisions to use force and thus empower the people who want to
make those decisions. It might structure reasoned public debates. It might make
apparent the considerations that are or ought to be at stake in the exercise of military
power. It might provide the normative material for criticism or sanction. Or it might
catalyze subsequent processes for accountability or reform. We should not assume that
war powers regulation always does one thing or that any particular regulatory technique consistently does the same thing(s).
Third, this chapter is mostly descriptive and analytic, rather than normative. It is
worth underscoring, however, that no single regulatory technique is inherently good or
bad in the abstract. Some situations call for quick and decisive, rather than constrained
or cautious, action. Some require secrecy, instead of transparency. Some warrant a
serious military response, despite the uncertainties or risks of escalation. And in
general, reasonable people can-and often do-disagree about whether, when, and
subject to what constraints military operations are desirable. Normative assessments of
war powers regulation should, in my view, account for that variance. This chapter's
typology can enhance such assessments by expanding an appraiser's frame of reference
and illuminating the different ways in which a country's legal architecture can shape
behavior on war powers.

I.

SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS

One technique for regulating war powers is to establish substantive standards on when
the government may or may not use military force. This is a commitment device. It
helps preserve a country's long-term military policies by limiting the discretion of
governmental officials to deploy the armed forces in the heat of a moment. Yet the
stickiness of any such commitment is likely to vary, depending on where the standards
are established-for example, whether they are constitutionalized or just legislatively
enacted-how easy they are to change, and how precisely they are defined.
Japan stands out for its particularly strict substantive standards on the use of force.
As Tadashi Mori explains, any use of force by Japan must be consistent with both the
international jus ad bellum and additional restrictions under Japanese law. 2 The precise
content of the jus ad bellum is unsettled, but it generally is thought to prohibit crossborder force except: (1) in individual or collective self-defense, (2) pursuant to the
2
Tadashi Mori, Decisions in Japan to Use Military Force or to Participate in Multinational Peacekeeping Operations, ch. 46 in this volume.
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authorization of the UN Security Council, or (3) with the territorial state's consent.3
Beyond that, Japan's Constitution provides that "the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation" and that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained." 4 Historically, this language was thought
to permit Japan to use force only in individual self-defense. Further, the Japanese
government interpreted that authority narrowly-to mean that it could deploy the
armed forces only if an armed attack on Japanese soil occurred, Japan's survival and the
protection of its people were at stake, there was not a feasible alternative for repelling
the attack, the minimum amount of force that was necessary for self-defense was used,
and the force was otherwise consistent with the jus ad helium's requirements for selfdefense.5
Over time, the government has interpreted the Constitution more permissively but
still to allow the government to use force only in very limited circumstances. As Mori
explains, the government now claims the authority to use force in collective selfdefense, so long as such force is consistent with international law, the minimum
necessary to repel an attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship
with Japan, and necessary to ensure Japan's survival and the protection of its people.6
In addition, the Diet has occasionally enacted legislation to permit Japanese forces to
operate outside theaters of hostility or to provide logistical or ancillary support for
security operations. 7 For example, Japanese forces may now support operations in
situations that the UN Security Council or General Assembly has determined are
threats to international peace and security. 8 Japanese forces may also participate in
international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, subject to certain
3

UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 39, and 51; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 246 (June 27) (recognizing that an
outside state's intervention "is already allowable at the request of the government of a State"). I have
recently argued that this formulation of the jus ad helium is not altogether accurate. See Monica Hakimi,
The Jus ad Bellum's Regulatory Form, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 151 (2018).
4
NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENP6] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan). Japan has considered revising this
constitutional provision. As of March 15, 2018, there were seven competing draft amendments in
circulation. See Reiji Yoshida, LDP Panel Fails to Form Consensus over Revision of War-Renouncing
art. 9, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/15/
national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-panel-fails-form-consensus-revision-war-renouncing-article-9/#.
WrAJgolpBTZ.
5
6
Mori, supra note 2.
Id.
7
E.g., Heisei Jusan-nen Ku-gatsu Juichi-nichi no Amerika Gasshukoku ni oite Hassei shita Terorisuto
niyoru Kogeki to ni Taio shite Okonawareru Kokusairengokensho no Mokuteki-tassei no tameno
Shogaikoku no Katsudo ni taishite Waga Kuni ga Jisshi suru Sochi oyobi Kanren suru Kokusairengo
Ketsugi to ni Motozuku Jindoteki-sochi ni kansuru Tokubetsu-sochi Ho [Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law], Law No. 113, 2001, amended by Law No. 147, 2003, tentative English summary available at http://
japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html; Iraku ni okeru JindofukkoShienkatsudo oyobi Anzenkakuho-Shienkatsudo no Jisshi ni kansuru Tokubetsu-sochi Ho [Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq], Law No. 137, 2003,
translated in Mika Hayashi, The Japanese Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and
Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, 13 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 579, 587 (2004).
• Mori, supra note 2.
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constraints that significantly reduce the risk that they will find themselves in situations
where they will need to resort to the use of force. 9 All of these prescriptions limit a
sitting leader's discretion over military policy; they are designed to preserve the
country's strong constitutional norm against using force.
Germany's legal architecture similarly subjects use of force decisions to both the
international jus ad bellum and other constitutional constraints. With respect to the jus
ad bellum, Germany's Basic Law provides that "[t]he general rules of international law
shall be an integral part of federal law." 10 The Constitutional Court has interpreted that
language to mean that Germany must "compl[y] with the prohibition of the use of
force under customary international law." 11 The Basic Law also declares that "[a]cts
tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between
nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional ... [and]
made a criminal offence." 12
On top of those prescriptions, the Basic Law limits the use of military force to
circumstances that involve self-defense or are otherwise "expressly permitted by this
Basic Law." 13 The Basic Law then recognizes that Germany may "enter into a system of
mutual collective security" "[w]ith a view to maintaining peace." 14 Anne Peters
explains that, in the past, some within Germany interpreted those provisions to permit
deployments only in individual self-defense. 15 However, the German Constitutional
Court adopted a different interpretation in 1994. It clarified that the collective security
provision allows German armed forces to be deployed for peacekeeping and other
operations that "occur within and pursuant to the rules" of an international organization, such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 16
The outer bounds of this collective security authority remain unclear, but German
forces may now participate in at least some operations that are not taken to defend the
German state.
France has also established substantive standards on the use of military force, but
these standards are very different from the ones in Japan and Germany. In France, the
standards are crafted not as concrete directives but as broad policy principles, and
they are not formally binding. They posit, for example, that the use of force should

9

Id. (describing the 2015 International Peace Support Bill); see also Kokusairengo Heiwaiji-Katsudo
to ni taisuru Kyoryoku ni kansuru Horitsu [Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations and Other Operations], Law No. 79, 1992, amended by Law No. 157, 2001 and Law No. 118,
2006, translation at http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_j/ data/law/pdf/law_e. pdf.
10
GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [BASIC LAW] [CONSTITUTION],
art 25, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.
11
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/o7, July 3, 2007, para. 73, translation at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.
de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN / 2007 /07 /es20070703-2bveooo207en.html.
12
13
14
German Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 26(1).
Id. art. 87(a)(2).
Id. art. 24(2).
15
Anne Peters, Military Operations Abroad under the German Basic Law, ch. 44 in this volume.
16
BVerfG, 2 be 1/03, May 7, 2008, para. 62 (citing BVerfG 90, 2BvE 3/92, July 12, 1994, para. 255),
translation available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/
2008/05/es20080507_2bveooo103en.html. The 2008 judgment, which I quote in the main text, has
been translated and uses the same language as the 1994 judgment. See Peters, supra note 15, at p.793.
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generally be in response to a serious security threat; based on an assessment of the
available alternatives and of the mission's goals, scope, and costs; subject to French
political control; and consistent with international law. 17 These standards are not
designed to constrain the government's authority or discretion to act. Instead, they
articulate some of the policy considerations that should inform its decisions on
whether to use military force.
Countries that incorporate the international jus ad bellum into their domestic legal
systems might at some point have to address the question of how changes at the
international level affect their domestic authorities. For example, international lawyers
increasingly recognize that, over the past fifteen years, the right of self-defense has
become more permissive. Although the contours of this right remain unclear and
contested, a number of states now claim the authority to conduct operations that reflect
very expansive interpretations-particularly, for operations against nonstate actors or
in anticipation of attacks that are not temporally immediate. These states also routinely
act on their expansive claims, with little or no repercussion. 18
That dynamic within international law raises important questions for countries that
define their domestic authorities by reference to it. For instance, does a change in the
jus ad helium automatically become part of domestic law and license a government to
use force in ways that had previously been assumed to be prohibited? Or does the
change lack domestic legal effect until it is in some way incorporated through a
national process? Insofar as the jus ad bellum for a particular operation is unclear,
who within a government may define its content for purposes of domestic law? And
what steps, if any, should a country take to ensure that a government does not exploit
the fluidity in the jus ad bellum and push it in a permissive direction in order to justify
more easily operations under domestic law?

II.

ALLOCATION OF DECISIONMAKING
AUTHORITY

To the extent that force is not proscribed, a country must identify the governmental
organ that may decide to use it. Many countries divide decisionmaking authority in this
area between the executive and legislative branches of government. Because the
executive ultimately implements the decision, the key questions are whether, and if
so, when, how, and at what point in the process the legislature must participate.

17
For the complete list of these standards, see Mathias Forteau, Using Military Force and Engaging in
Collective Security: The Case of France, ch. 45 in this volume.
18
For a fuller discussion of this trend within the jus ad bellum, see Monica Hakimi & Jacob Katz
Cogan, The Two Codes on the Use of Force, 27 EuR. J. INT'L L. 257, 278-286 (2016).
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Some studies suggest that the robustness of any requirement of legislative participation turns on whether the legislature must authorize or consent to an operation
before it occurs. 19 That metric for assessment is too simplistic. If a campaign is
sprawling or long-lasting, and the legislature participates only in the initial decision
to use force, then its endorsement could become quite attenuated from the actual
exercise of military force.
The U.S. experience with the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) is a stark example. There, Congress authorized the president "to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons." 20 All three
branches of the U.S. government have said that the 2001 AUMF authorizes force not
only against groups that, in some way, participated in the 9/ 11 attacks but also
against the "associated forces"of those groups. 21 Further, the executive branch has
interpreted the "associated forces" language broadly. For example, the Obama administration claimed that the 2001 AUMF authorized a massive military campaign against
the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The administration's theory was that
ISIS was an associated force of al Qaeda because, although the two groups were no
longer formally affiliated, they once were, and the links between them had not
dissolved. 22 In addition, the Trump administration has claimed that the 2001 AUMF
authorized it to use force against states, like Syria and Iran, that put at serious risk the
nonstate groups that collaborate with the United States to defeat ISIS. 23 Whatever one
thinks of these particular applications of the AUMF, Congress's 2001 authorization is
not good evidence of its robust participation in U.S. military decisions that were made
more than fifteen years later.
Requiring the executive to obtain the legislature's approval for specific military
operations can contribute to the interests of transparency and accountability. Open
debate within the legislature helps air the reasons for and against an operation. It
presses those who want to conduct the operation to defend it publicly. A requirement
of legislative approval might also shape the content of the decision. Because a broader
range of officials have to accept that using force in a given case is appropriate, legislative
19

See, e.g., Yasuo Hasebe, War Powers, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 463, 464-465 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Saj6 eds., 2012); Wolfgang Wagner,
Parliamentary Control of Military Missions: Accounting for Pluralism, Occasional Paper No. 12, Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 4 (Aug. 2006) (describing as countries with "a high
level of parliamentary control" those in which "parliament must give its prior approval").
20
Pub. L. No. 107-140, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
21
See U.S. WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED
STATES' USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 4 (Dec. 2016)
[hereinafter WHITE HousE 2016 REPORT].
22
Id. at 4-7.
23
Letter from David J. Trachtenberg, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), to Senator Tim
Kaine (Jan. 29, 2018), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4383185-Kaine-TrumpISIS-war-power-letters.html.
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involvement often has a cooling effect, making use of force decisions more prudent,
cautious, and constrained than they otherwise would be. 24 Yet the legislature's involvement does not necessarily have that effect. If the legislature defers heavily to an
executive's security assessments or policy choices, then its endorsement might instead
increase the government's willingness to pursue a risky or uncertain military strategy; it
might diffuse responsibility for the decision and thus shield the executive from some of
the fallout if the operation goes badly. 25
Countries dearly weigh those eventualities differently. For countries that rely heavily
on the military as an instrument of foreign policy, there are real downsides to creating
impediments to military action. A recent debate in the United Kingdom is illustrative.
U.K. decisions to use force are part of the royal prerogative and fall exclusively within
the executive's domain, but the government recently considered changing that arrangement and requiring Parliament to participate in at least some use of force decisions.
A 2013 report by the House of Lords Constitution Committee recommended against
the change, in part because it could unduly constrain military action. 26 The committee
worried that, if Parliament participated in use of force decisions, it might try to restrict
how force is used, which "could harm military effectiveness and limit commanders'
freedom of maneuver." 27 Further, a requirement of parliamentary participation might
undercut the government's capacity to project its military might. The committee's
explained:
There may be instances where the UK's international obligations require the
Government to commit to action-for example to achieve collective security with
fellow NATO members. In such instances it would be detrimental to the Government's position to be in doubt as to whether they can secure the commitment of
Her Majesty's armed forces. 28
Here, a state's longstanding military policy depends in part on empowering the
executive to resort, relatively easily, to the use of force.

Allocation Based on the Nature of the Operation
States have various options for dividing authority between the executive and legislative
branches of government. One approach is to allocate such authority differently,
24

E.g., Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, supra note 1, at 9 ("[European] states with very strong or
strong parliamentary war powers tended to be significantly less involved in the 2003 Iraq war compared
to states with weak parliaments.").
25
See Jide Nzelibe, Are Congressionally Authorized Wars Perverse?, 59 STAN. L. RBv. 907 (2007).
26

CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE USE OF ARMED FORCE,

2013-14, HL 46, para. 61 (U.K.), available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/
ldselect/ldconst/ 46/ 46. pd£
27
28
Id. at para. 57.
Id. at para. 58.
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depending on the nature of the operation. Most, if not all, states allow the executive
branch to act unilaterally in at least certain kinds of cases-for example, during
emergencies or in self-defense. These states might then distinguish those cases from
others that require legislative participation.
Consider again Japan. Under the 2015 International Peace Support Act, the Japanese
Prime Minister must seek prior Diet approval before deploying the country's armed
forces outside Japan.29 But as Tadashi Mori explains, prior approval is not requiredand the prime minister may decide unilaterally to use force-if it is necessary to
address a domestic emergency. In that event, the prime minister must expeditiously
obtain the Diet's retroactive approval or cease the military operation. 30 This arrangement affords the prime minister limited room to make a unilateral decision only
because and to the extent that the nature of the operation requires it.
The situation in Germany is similar. Under both constitutional and statutory law, the
Bundestag must generally agree to the "deployment of German armed forces," meaning
situations in which German soldiers are involved or are expected to be involved in
armed undertakings. 31 However, German law recognizes an exception and entitles the
executive branch to act unilaterally in cases of imminent danger. If the executive acts on
its own, it must promptly end the operation or seek the Bundestags approval. 32
Separately, German law clarifies that the Bundestag need not authorize military operations that do not have the characteristics of a "deployment" -operations in which the
military takes measures that are only preparatory, for planning purposes, or to provide
humanitarian aid, without any concrete expectation of combat. 33 Again, the nature of
the operation is what determines whether and when the Bundestag must participate.
The U.S. president has discretion to act unilaterally in a much broader range of cases,
but that range is still defined partly by the nature of the operation. As Curtis Bradley
explains, the bounds of executive authority in this area are unclear and contested. Most
believe that, as a matter of original understanding, the Constitution entitles the
president to decide unilaterally to use force only in cases of self-defense. 34 But that
understanding has eroded over time, as the executive has claimed the authority to

29
Kokusai Heiwa Kyodotaisho jittai ni saishite Waga Kllll.i ga jisshisuru Shogaikoku no Guntai nadoni
taisuru Kyoryoku Shijikatsud6 nado ni kansuru H6ritsu [Law Related to the Implementation of Japan's
Cooperative Support for the Armed Forces of Foreign Countries in Circumstances ofintemational Peace and
Security Cooperation Activity] [International Peace Support Act], Law No. 77, 2015, arts. 4-6, available at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/housei_seibi.html, English language summary available in JAPAN
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 2015 DEFENSE OF JAPAN ANNUAL WHITE PAPER 147 fig. II-1-3-12, available at
http://www.modgo.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ 2015.html.
30
Mori, supra note 2.
31
Federal Law on Parliamentary Approval of International Deployment of Armed Forces [2005
Parliamentary Act], Mar. 18, 2005, BGBI. 2005 I, 775, § 1(2), unofficially translated in Katja S. Ziegler,
The Model of a "Parliamentary Army" Under the German Constitution, HOUSE OF Lo Ros CoNST. COMM.
(Dec. 7, 2005), at Annex II, available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldconst/
236/ 5120707.htm#n141.
32
33
Id. at § 5.
Id. at § 2(2).
34
Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. War Powers and the Potential Bene.fits of Comparativism, ch. 42 in this
volume.
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use force without congressional participation in an increasingly expansive set of
circumstances. Thus, when the executive articulated its legal justification for the 2011
Libya operation, it recognized only "one possible constitutionally-based limit on this
presidential authority to employ military force in defense of important national interests."35 It asserted that "a planned military engagement that constitutes a 'war' ... may
require prior congressional authorization." 36 It then defined "war" in terms of the
"'anticipated nature, scope, and duration' of the use of force," and contended that "this
standard generally will be satisfied only by prolonged and substantial military engagements."37 In short, the president now claims unilateral authority for all but the most
extensive military operations, at least insofar as Congress has not expressed a contrary
view. 38 The claim rests partly on the nature of the operation.

Allocation Based on the Duration of the Operation
Another approach for allocating decisionmaking authority is temporal-to permit the
executive branch to use force only for a set period absent legislative approval. The
Japanese and German examples show that this approach can be used concurrently with
the first. In each of those countries, the executive may act unilaterally in certain kinds of
cases for very limited periods. It must expeditiously obtain the legislature's consent in
order to continue those operations. In other countries, the executive's unilateral
authority is defined primarily in temporal terms. It has broad discretion to decide on
its own to use military force, but it may do so only for a set period.
The temporal approach reflects a balance. The executive has discretion to conduct
operations that it decides, based on its expertise, are in the national interest. But its
discretion is limited to inhibit it from taxing the country for prolonged periods without
buy-in from other domestic actors. This approach carries some risks. First, the costs of
extricating the armed forces from a theater of combat might be very high or unpredictable. An executive that unilaterally takes the country into hostilities might box the
legislature in, such that it feels compelled to acquiesce in an operation that it thinks is
bad policy and would not have accepted ex ante. Second, if a country's enemies are wellattuned to its domestic situation, they might try to wait out the clock in the expectation
or hope that the country will unilaterally withdraw its forces at a date certain.
The relevant time period varies by country. In the Czech Republic, parliamentary
approval is required after sixty days. 39 In France, the period is four months. 40 In the
35

Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney General, "Authority to Use Military Force in Libya" (Apr. 11,
2011).
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

See also Bradley, supra note 34 (analyzing U.S. executive claims).
UsTAVA CESKE REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION], 1/1993 Sb. (as amended), art. 43, translated at
http://www.psp.cz/ en/ docs/laws/constitution.html.
40
1958 CONST. art. 35, translated at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/
english/constitution/constitution-of-4-october-19 58.2 5742.html.
39
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United States, the situation is more complicated. As discussed, the U.S. president
claims the authority to act unilaterally for the vast majority of operations. However,
the War Powers Resolution (WPR) requires him to withdraw U.S. forces within sixty
days from situations in which hostilities are occurring or are expected to occur unless:
(1) Congress authorizes the operation or extends the sixty-day clock, (2) Congress is
physically unable to meet due to an attack on the United States, or (3) the president
decides that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of the United States
Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces" for up to thirty
additional days. 41 Congress may also cut short the sixty-day period, at least for
operations involving hostilities outside the United States.42
The Obama administration softened the bite of the WPR clock in 2011, when it
narrowly interpreted the circumstances that qualify as "hostilities." The administration
asserted that its participation in a multilateral operation in Libya did not need to be
approved or terminated within sixty days because the nature of the U.S. mission, the
exposure of U.S. armed forces, the risk of escalation, and the military means employed
by the United States were all sufficiently limited so as not to count as hostilities under
the WPR 43 The practical effect of this position is to narrow the range of cases that are
subject to the sixty-day dock.

Allocation of Ancillary Authorities
Finally, a legislature might have ancillary authorities with which to influence use of
force decisions. For example, although the Japanese Constitution does not assign to any
branch of government the authority to decide to use military force, the Diet has
repeatedly passed legislation to elaborate on the sparse constitutional text. Here, a
legislature uses its interpretive and prescriptive authorities to define the circumstances
in which the armed forces may be deployed and thus to delineate the scope of the
executive's authority in this area.
In the United States, Congress controls the purse, and the Constitution provides that
no appropriation "[t]o raise and support Armies ... shall be for a longer Term than two
Years." 44 Many consider this to be Congress's principal mechanism for participating in
use of force decisions. 45 It requires Congress periodically to decide what military
41

War Powers Resolution §§ 4(a)(1) & 5, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1543-1544 [hereinafter WPR].

Id.
Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 112th Cong. 7-40 (June 28,
2011) (testimony of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State), available at
42

43

http:/ /fas.org/irp/congress/ 2011_hr/libya.pdf.
44
U.S. CONST., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 12.
45
See, e.g., Reid Skibell, Separation-of-Powers and the Commander in Chief Congress's Authority to
Override Presidential Decisions in Crisis Situations, 13 GEo. MASON L. REv. 183, 195 (2004) ("[T]he
spending power has become Congress's primary tool in influencing military and, to a large degree,
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capabilities the president will have and thus whether he will be equipped to implement
his preferred military policies. It might also exert some control on his decisions.
Congress has occasionally used its spending power to limit specific military operations.
Moreover, even when it does not try to restrict the president's decisions, his dependence on it for funding gives him an incentive to obtain its support, both before
initiating a major military operation and over the course of the campaign. Yet in the
modern era, various factors-ranging from a lack of political will in Congress to the
complexities of the appropriations process to the vast scale of the U.S. military-limit
the extent to which the Congress uses its appropriations power to participate in specific
use of force decisions. 46

III.

OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW

No matter whether the decision to use force is made unilaterally or with legislative
participation, it might be subject to various mechanisms for oversight or review. These
mechanisms again differ in their details, but most involve the sharing of information.
They help bring to light the facts that triggered the use of force, whether alternatives to
military force were considered or taken, the operation's objectives, its expected duration, or its likelihood of success. Such information can then be used to hold the
government accountable for a decision. It might also shape the content of a decision.
Officials might be disinclined to exceed their authorities or to act imprudently if they
know that bad decisions will be publicly scrutinized or sanctioned.

Legislative Oversight
Legislatures have different tools for reviewing use of force decisions. They might
summon executive branch officials for public hearings. They might interrogate these
officials orally or in writing. They might demand access to certain documents. Or they
might initiate processes of judicial review. 47
A legislature's oversight authority can but need not be coextensive with its authority
to participate in the decision to use force. The distinction was evident, for example, in
foreign policy decisions."); John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167, 295, 297 (1996) (arguing that "the Framers intended
to participate in war-making by controlling appropriations" and that this framework perseveres in the
modern era because "Congress fully understands that its appropriations may be used to check executive
military decisions").
46

See generally Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the
Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REv. 447 (2011).
47
See Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, supra note 1, at 11.
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the 2015 German Constitutional Court judgment on a rescue operation in Libya. 48 The
operation took place in 2011, after the Libyan civil war broke out but before the UN
Security Council authorized the use of force. At the German chancellor's direction,
German forces evacuated 132 people from an industrial base in Libya, without any
combat action. Afterward, a parliamentary group filed a complaint before the Constitutional Court, arguing that the executive's unilateral decision to use force had to be
submitted to the Bundestag for its retroactive approval. The court disagreed. It determined that the executive had unilateral authority to act because the situation presented
an emergency. However, the court then said that the executive was obligated to inform
the Bundestag of the details of the operation, so that it could meaningfully perform its
oversight functions. Here, the executive was not required to obtain the Bundestag's
authorization for the use of force but was required to share with it information so that it
could review the decision.
Other countries also require the executive branch to inform the legislature of
decisions to use force. In France, the executive must, within three days of initiating a
sustained operation in another country, inform Parliament of the operation and
describe its objectives. 49 The French Parliament may then choose to debate, without
taking a formal vote on, the decision. In the United States, the WPR requires the
president to inform Congress within two days of a deployment. 50 U.S. presidents have
routinely complied with this reporting obligation, even though they have resisted other
aspects of the WPR.
The role of the U.K. Parliament in overseeing use of force decisions is more informal
and, as Katja Ziegler explains, in flux. 51 The House of Lords does not have any legal
authority to participate in use of force decisions, but the government has in recent years
recognized a constitutional convention-an accepted practice-of consulting with
Parliament and affording it the opportunity to debate and vote on decisions to use
force before troops are committed. 52 This convention, which was initiated with the
2003 Iraq War, appears to have had some bite in a few cases. Perhaps most notably,
the prime minister chose in 2013 to abide by Parliament's vote not to intervene in

48
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WPR, supra note 41, § 4.
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this volume.
52
For an argument that a constitutional convention on parliamentary oversight has also emerged in
Canada, see Ryan Patrick Alford, War with ISIL: Should Parliament Decide?, 20 REv. CONST. STUD. 118
(2015). Alford argues that the Canadian convention requires a parliamentary debate before troops are
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Syria in response to that government's use of chemical weapons. 53 But in practice, the
convention has not consistently been followed, and its scope of application remains
unclear. 54 Indeed, when Syria was caught still using chemical weapons in 2018, the
prime minister participated in military strikes without first taking the issue to
Parliament. 55
As discussed, the U.K. government has considered transforming this convention
into a formal requirement of parliamentary participation. However, a 2013 report by
the U.K. House of Lords Constitution Committee ultimately argued for preserving it in
its current form, as a tool for political oversight and control. 56 The committee argued
that one benefit of this arrangement is that formalization might invite courts to review
more rigorously the government's use of force decisions. 57 "There was consensus
amongst our witnesses that the appropriate forum for controlling and scrutinising
deployment decisions is Parliament, not the courts." 58

Judicial Oversight
The United Kingdom is not alone in limiting the availability of judicial review in this
area. As Mathias Forteau explains, French courts regularly invoke the so-called "act of
government theory" to find that they lack jurisdiction to rule on claims against the
government concerning the use of force. 59 Similarly, Curtis Bradley explains that
U.S. "courts in the modern era have invoked various 'justiciability' limitations to
avoid addressing these issues."60 In these countries, courts restrain themselves and
decline to review specific use of force decisions. By contrast, German courts have
actively overseen such decisions. 61 They have repeatedly assessed the legality of particular military operations.
Courts might be institutionally ill-equipped to oversee use of force decisions for any
number of reasons. They might lack the expertise necessary to assess a government's
national security claims. They might be incapable of checking the government's factual
assertions. They might have to rely on secret information that they cannot then use to
53
Prime Minister David Cameron, Statement to House of Commons, Sept. 9, 2013, available at
https:/ /publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm201314/ cmhansrd/cm130909/debtext/130909-0001.htm ("I am
clear that it was right to advocate a strong response to the indiscriminate gassing of men, women and
children in Syria, and to make that case in this Chamber. At the same time I understand and respect
what this House has said. So Britain will not be part of any military action.... ").
54
See Claire Mills, Parliamentary Approval for Military Action, Briefing Paper No. 7166, at 3, HousE
OF COMMONS LIBRARY (May 12, 2015), available at https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/
ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7166.
55
See House of Commons Library, Parliamentary Approval for Military Action (Apr. 17, 2018),
available at https://researchbriefings. parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7166#fullreport.
56
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and 64.
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justify their decisions. 62 And if the country's laws do not define, in relatively specific
terms, when force is or is not permissible, they might lack judicially manageable
standards based on which to evaluate specific operations. It is not surprising that
U.K., French, and U.S. courts refrain from assessing use of force decisions, given that
the executive in each country has or claims to have so much discretion in this area;
these courts lack concrete legal standards to apply. Inviting courts to review the legality
of specific operations thus can put them in difficult positions. It might require them to
make the kinds of judgments that are better suited for the other branches of
government.
But judicial review can also be quite valuable. First, the possibility of courts evaluating specific decisions might check the officials who want to make those decisions and
inhibit them from overstepping their legal authorities. In this way, judicial review can
help preserve the basic structure of and allocation of authority within a government.
Second, when courts apply the law in concrete cases, they elaborate on its content and
flesh out the legal framework that governs future decisions. This lawmaking component of judicial decisions is especially useful if the constitutional and statutory texts that
regulate the use of force are sparse, inconsistent, or disconnected from contemporary
sensibilities or realities. For example, the 1994 decision of the German Constitutional
Court on collective security operations in effect updated Germany's Basic Law for the
modern era. Third, judicial review of governmental decisions prods those who exercise
authority to justify their decisions publicly, in legal terms, and for external scrutiny.
It thus contributes to basic rule of law values. 63

Diffuse Oversight
Most democratic states also have other, more diffuse mechanisms for oversight or
review. In the case of the United States, Jack Goldsmith has described a national
security apparatus that is heavily scrutinized by an amalgam of actors, who are formally
disconnected from one another and operate from both within and outside of government.64 As Goldsmith describes it, dozens of executive branch officials, with diverse
institutional perspectives and priorities, weigh in on national security decisions, especially as they relate to targeted killing and covert operations. These officials can shape
the president's decisions before they are taken and through systematic assessments
62

Cf Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane).
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over time. In addition, executive branch officials routinely leak information about the
government's security operations to the press. This allows the operations to be aired
publicly and contested by civil society groups that oppose them. If enough constituents
disagree with the government's military decisions, they can then try to change its
policies by voting for different officials in the next election.

IV.

REFLECTIONS ON COMPARATIVE
WAR POWERS WORK

Although the above typology is only preliminary, it raises fairly fundamental questions
about comparative war powers work: to what extent and in what ways is such work
valuable? How might it help lawyers and policymakers who make or analyze use of
force decisions?
There are at least two reasons to be cautious. First, countries vary significantly
in how strictly and through what techniques they regulate the use of force. Indeed,
the relevance of a given technique might vary even within a single country. Take the
division of authority, as between the U.S. president and Congress, on decisions to
use force. Although the president's authority in this area has expanded considerably
since World War II, there continues to be widespread support for the norm that
requires the president to obtain Congress's approval before initiating at least some
armed operations. Yet the salience of that norm is extremely variable. It depends on a
host of case-specific factors, including the security problem that the president wants to
address, the nature of the anticipated operation, and the politics that surround it, both
within and outside of the United States. For example, President Obama sought
congressional support when he was contemplating even a limited strike against Syria
for its use of chemical weapons in 2013, 65 but he did not go to Congress for the fairly
extended campaign against Libya in 2011. 66 Likewise, he invoked Congress's authorization in the 2001 AUMF to justify using defensive force against al-Shabaab militants
in Somalia, but he relied on his own constitutional authority for very similar strikes
against Houthi militants in Yemen. 67 The point is not that the norm on congressional
authorization does not do any work but that the work that it does is highly contingent
on the circumstances of a case.
A similar point might be made about other countries. Since the U.K. convention on
parliamentary consultations emerged in 2003, its salience has varied considerably
across cases. The differential treatment of the 2013 and 2018 Syria cases is illustrative.
65
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Likewise, the circumstances in which Germany may participate in multilateral
operations under the Basic Law's collective security provision are unsettled and, in at
least some respects, contingent on the facts. 68 Such variance within countries complicates efforts to extract general principles on how they regulate the use of force, let alone
general principles that can then be translated for comparison and contrast with the
entirely different institutional arrangements of a foreign country.
The second reason why comparative work on war powers is particularly challenging
is that, relative to other areas of foreign affairs, this one seems more deeply connected
to each country's national ethos-its sense of its own character as a country. Here,
Philip Bobbitt's work on what he calls ethical reasoning in U.S. constitutional law is
illuminating. As Bobbitt describes it, ethical reasoning invokes a country's ethos, either
expressly or by implication, as a justification or source of authority for concrete legal
positions. Ethical reasoning is not the same as moral reasoning. It does not "claim that
a particular solution is right or wrong in any sense larger than that the solution
comports with the sort of people we are and the norms we have chosen to solve
political and customary constitutional problems." 69 To say that ethical reasoning is
salient in war powers regulation is to say that the country's ethos is routinely at issue
and part of what is at stake in concrete legal battles and decisions on the use of force. 70
War powers regulation would reflect, be a vehicle for arguing about, and help shape
deeply held views about what the country stands for.
Of course, people within a country might disagree about its ethos. For example, most
Americans seem to accept that the United States is and ought to be a military
superpower. But they routinely disagree about when, where, and how it ought to
project its military might. This means that the American ethos relating to the military
is not entirely stable or shared. The "true" ethos might be hard to pin down, and
arguments about it might not be reliable indicators of what it really is. 71 Ethical
reasoning would still be prevalent in U.S. war powers regulation if Americans routinely
tap into variants of the national ethos to argue about or make specific decisions on the
use of force.
They seem to do quite a bit of that. As a concrete example, recall that the
U.S. executive branch claims that the president has unilateral authority "to direct U.S.
military forces in engagements necessary to advance American national interests
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abroad," except perhaps when those engagements amount to full-scale "wars."72 The
executive branch has never publicly articulated the criteria for identifying the national
interests that this claim covers. But it has invoked the claim to justify, on a case-by-case
basis, forcible operations for a range of amorphous foreign policy goals. According to the
executive branch, the national interests for which the president may unilaterally decide to
use force include things like preserving stability in various parts of the world, bolstering
the credibility of NATO or the United Nations, and deterring of the use and proliferation
of chemical weapons. 73
These executive branch justifications for the use of force are dripping with ethical
reasoning. They invoke and rely on a particular view of the United States and its
relationship with the rest of the world. In this view, virtually any security problem
anywhere in the world affects U.S. interests, deploying the U.S. military is often the
appropriate response, and the military is such a routine part of U.S. foreign policy that
the president need not go through all that much trouble to sell particular operations to
the U.S. Congress or, for that matter, to the American public; using the military to
address global security issues is just part of what we do and who we are as Americans.
Ethical reasoning also seems to animate how other countries regulate war powers.
Remember that one reason that the United Kingdom chose not to turn the convention
on parliamentary consultations into a binding requirement is that any such requirement might be "detrimental" to U.K. foreign and military policy. 74 This reasoning
again has ethical notes. It reflects a vision of the United Kingdom's standing in the
world, defined partly through the projection of a strong and active military. Along
similar lines, when Germany's Constitutional Court applies the Basic Law's collective
security provision, its reasoning seems to be heavily ethical. It portrays Germany as a
good global citizen that is committed to establishing peace and security by working
through international institutions. It defines Germany's ethos in those terms.
If ethical reasoning drives a lot of war powers regulation, as it seems to do, then
national officials are likely to be hesitant to use comparative methods to address
specific use of force questions. Rather than look to other countries for guidance,
these officials will probably tap into their own sense of the national ethos. This might
be true even as between countries, like the United States and the United Kingdom, that
share certain histories and traditions, and use many of the same regulatory techniques.
The ethos is ultimately a national construct. Moreover, where ethical reasoning is
prominent, comparative war powers work is unlikely to have much explanatory force.
The questions of why specific countries adopt the regulatory techniques that they do or
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how those techniques play out in concrete cases will best be answered by looking
internally.
Yet this does not mean that comparative research on war powers regulation is
fruitless. Quite the contrary. Because ethical reasoning seems so prominent in this
area, such research can help crystallize and bring to the public consciousness aspects of
a national ethos that otherwise go unnoticed. Learning how different countries regulate
the use of force can deepen our understanding not only of those countries but also, and
perhaps more critically, of our own. It can bring into sharp relief what a country is
really about-how it defines itself as a polity and conceives of its relationship to the rest
of the world.

